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make sense of oneself and the world in terms of the religious account and
to continually be working out that account more fully. In this latter characterization, some of what appears to be consumerist reading must surely be
going on, i.e., consumerist reading in terms of the kind of reading-quick,
cursory, not committing to memory. But it is not consumerist reading in
terms of the second thread, the purpose of the reading. For consumerist
reading is self-absorptive, focused on creative production for its own sake,
whereas religious reading is fundamentally reading aimed at providing a
better and deeper religious account of the world.
The questions I have raised about the role of memory and the nature of
virtuosi readers are only intended to rein in some of Griffiths' analyses
where the distinctions are drawn perhaps too starkly. His fundamental
point about the loss of religious reading and its importance in learning and
living a religious account of the world is surely right. It has implications for
the future of universities and religious institutions of learning and worship. It also has personal implications: one should start memorizing,
choose more carefully what to read, and be more intentional about the task
of giving a religious account. Griffiths seeks to convert readers to the practice of religious reading. I have been so converted.

Characters in Search of Their Author: The Gifford Lectures, Glasgow 1999-2000
by Ralph McInerny. University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, 132pp. $25.00.
LAURA GARCIA, Boston College
In these lectures, presented in Glasgow in October and November of 1999
and February of 2000, Professor McInerny spins a fascinating tale of the
history of philosophy since Descartes that reads like a novel. Though he
finds most of the major modern figures wanting with respect to their philosophical views, they emerge from these pages as living, three-dimensional
persons, so vividly portrayed that one's previous encounters with them
seem to have taken place in a kind of philosophical flatland. We follow
Descartes from his famous dream as a young soldier to his death in
Stockholm in the presence of his priest and confessor. Looking back to a
medieval thinker, we pause beside Anselm of Canterbury in "the first stall
on the left in the monastery at Bec in Normandy," chanting Psalm 41: "The
fool has said in his heart there is no God."
The burden of these early lectures is to show that the trajectory of philosophy tends toward today's widespread intellectual nihilism, a philosophical attitude that McInerny calls "radical chic." The remainder of Part
I of the book begins a ground-clearing operation for the project of nahlral
theology, itself taken up more explicitly in Part II. Nihilism or anti-realism
confronts Aristotle's defense of the first principle of reason, the law of noncontradiction. Following St. Thomas (just a coincidence?) McInerny argues
that logical and psychological versions of this principle depend on its ontological formulation: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the
same time and in the same respect" (p. 48). The connection between
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thought and reality, problematic since Descartes and denied altogether by
anti-realists, must be accepted at least in this instance. Any reasoned objection to this principle turns out to be untenable.
McInerny turns next to the fideist's objection to natural theology, that the
search for proofs of God's existence and nature is both fruitless and likely to
be badly motivated. He assesses Smen Kierkegaard's suspicion of reason in
the realm of faith, showing sympathy with Kierkegaard regarding the mysteries of faith (revealed doctrines inaccessible to unaided reason) but preserving a role for reason in arriving at the preambles of faith (e.g., God's
existence, unity, and intelligence). A strong piece of evidence for the latter
claim is the work of Aristotle. "For Thomas, natural theology is not a possibility. It is a fact. It is the achievement of pagan philosophy"(p. 66).
The second series of lectures, "The Recovery of Natural Theology," does
in fact review and endorse st. Thomas' proof from motion for an l.mmoved
mover. But McInerny warns against the cursory treatment this argument
customarily receives in introductory philosophy courses. Building as it
does on Aristotle's proof for the same conclusion in Books 7 and 8 of the
Physics, the argument requires an understanding of the groundwork laid in
preceding books of the Physics as a precondition of an informed and intelligent appraisal. McInerny's more general point is that "Proofs for the existence of God can neither be fashioned nor appraised without reliance on a
vast fund of knowledge" (p. 78). The speaker and the hearer (or the writer
and reader) must share several fundamental assumption" and goals: that a
proof is an attempt to know something objectively true, that truth in these
matters is possible, that it is of paramount importance, and so on. It is no
surprise that when these assumptions are missing, attempts at natural theology meet with indifference or incomprehension.
Subsequent lectures explore possible causes of the ongoing intellectual
indigestion concerning natural theology. Some complain that it has no
practical significance or that it has been rendered irrelevant by advances in
the natural sciences. Departing from Kierkegaard and John Henry
Newman, McInerny insists that knowledge of God's existence, unlike most
practical knowledge, can be attained even by the morally corrupt and that
it does not necessarily lead to an exemplary life. That is, he preserves a
healthy distinction between theoretical and practical uses of reason, without claiming that one can be wholly insulated from the other. McInerny
insists in this section that there is an objective or 'intrinsic' appraisal of an
argument that proceeds independently of the character or antecedent dispositions of the argument's defender. He does concede, however, that a
sufficiently entrenched negative attitude toward belief in God "all but
guarantees that the task will not be undertaken in such a way that will
allow the truth of the matter to shine through" (p. 107).
McInerny professes disagreement with Newman's claim that the illative
sense ranges over all forms of reasoning, theoretical as well as practical. But
since one's attitudes do seem to influence the attempt at an objective (intrinsic) appraisal of a theoretical argument, Newman may be on to something.
Newman claims that the illative sense, a form of practical reasoning or judgment, must decide when the premises are to be accepted as true, when the
objections have been satisfactorily disposed of, and so forth. The question
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of basic logical validity may not involve the illative sense, and Aristotle saw
no need to invoke any such faculty for premises he deemed self-evident or
evident to the senses. But after the modern turn that McInerny laments at
length in Part I, it now takes (at least for some) a conscious decision to trust
those claims of common sense that earlier philosophers might take for
granted. Wherever the will enters in, practical judgment comes into play
about when and where and how enthusiastically to give one's assent.
McInerny closes with a rousing endorsement and defense of John Paul
II's attitude toward faith and reason, presented in the papal encyclical Fides
et Ratio. This approach insists both on the autonomy of philosophy in relying on reason for its conclusions and assessments, and on an attitude of
openness to truth that is beyond human reason (and may in fact be reason's
ultimate fulfillment). It is autonomy but not self-sufficiency that philosophy needs in order to flourish. As for the brand of modern philosophy
that deliberately closes off the path from reason to faith, McInerny calls this
"lapsed Christian philosophy" and its adherents "theologians manques."
The atheological presuppositions that would preclude all discussion of God
thus instantiate the very philosophical bigotry of which they so often
accuse believing philosophers.
Worse still, mistrust of the Creator has led to a mistrust of the creature
as well, so that it is up to believers to defend the capacity of the human
mind to know the truth. In Fides et Ratio and in McInerny'S book as well,
Christianity emerges as the philosopher's best friend. For a spirited, intelligent, and deftly-written defense of these and other "preambles to the preambles" of faith, this book is an excellent place to begin.

Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought by John Lippitt. Macmillan
Press/St Martin's Press, 2000. xii and 210 pp. Cloth. $65.00
Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, edited by D.Z. Phillips and T. Tessin.
Macmillan Press/St Martin's Press, 2000. xxi and 303 pp. Cloth. $65.00
ANTHONY RUDD, St Olaf College
A well-established popular conception of Kierkegaard has it that he is a
fideistic irrationalist, and that the dominant tone of his writings is one of
melancholy and gloom. These perceptions are vigorously challenged in
these two volumes.
As he admits in the first sentence ("Kierkegaard and humour? But isn't
he so gloomy?") Lippitt's title is liable to surprise those who have acquired
the simple image of Kierkegaard as "the melancholy Dane." Yet, as is
apparent to readers of at any rate his pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard
is, for all the undoubted bleakness of some of his writing, probably the
most humourous of all major philosophical authors. Wit, satire and comedy are pervasive features of many of his works, and (moving from use to
mention) he is as interested in analyzing the existential significance of
irony and humour as he is in anxiety, guilt or despair. Commentators have,

